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climate change, are weak. 
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machine. As an accompanying Policy Brief demonstrates, this government
intervention requires a combination of carbon pricing and R&D subsidies.
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subsidies, are currently shapeless and do not manage to create the
necessary incentives to invest in clean innovation:
- The implicit tax rate on energy in the EU27 is low and fragmented.  The
carbon price in the EU Emissions Trading System is too volatile;
- Public R&D expenditures dedicated to energy and environment are
relatively low and not coordinated among countries. Moreover, its
dynamics send mixed signals to investors. 
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momentum is not to be wasted.
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REINHILDE VEUGELERS AND CLÉMENT SERRE,NOVEMBER 2009
1 THE IMPORTANCE OF THE INNOVATION MACHINE
FOR TACKLING CLIMATE CHANGE
The evidence provided by climate scientists
clearly signals the size of the climate change chal-
lenge, meaning that a large-scale and speedy re-
action is required. Economic simulations (eg
Carraro et al, 2008) show that to keep the costs
of mitigating and adapting to climate change
‘manageable’, we need a sufficiently broad portfo-
lio of active technologies. For mitigation these in-
clude (i) technologies to reduce emissions such
as energy efficiency, carbon capture and storage,
and (ii) low-carbon technologies such as renew-
able-energy generation and nuclear power. Al-
though much can be done if existing technologies
are diffused (McKinsey, 2009), new technologies
also need to become available, particularly back-
stop technologies that are zero-emission and not
dependent on constrained resources.  These new
technologies are not yet available or still far from
large-scale commercialisation.  
Given the size and nature of the climate challenge,
the innovation machine needs to work optimally.
Will it be effective to deal with the climate chal-
lenge if left operating as it currently does, ie if we
follow a business-as-usual scenario?  To answer
this question, we look in this policy contribution
at the recent performance of the green innovation
machine. We first provide evidence showing that
the innovation machine has so far not functioned
as it needs to in the face of the climate challenge.
We explain why private green innovation cannot
be expected to do the job without proper govern-
ment intervention. We then illustrate the poor his-
torical record of green public intervention, before
concluding with some more hopeful signals for the
future. In an accompanying policy brief1 we dis-
cuss in more detail how policy should be (re)de-
signed to build and sustain a well-functioning
private green innovation machine, capable of deal-
ing with the climate-change challenge.
2 EVIDENCE FROM THE PAST PERFORMANCE OF
THE PRIVATE GREEN INNOVATION MACHINE
We evaluate the performance of the private green
innovation machine by considering its capacity to
(i) implement green innovations (ii) generate new
green innovations (as measured by green
patents) and (iii) commit resources to research
and development to generate green innovations.
We use only the standard official R&D, patent and
innovation datasets because they are compara-
ble across sectors, technologies, countries and
time2,3. 
2.1 Evidence on the take-up of green innovations
We first review the evidence on the take-up of
green innovations by the business sector. These
green innovations are either developed by the
firms themselves or (as is mostly the case)
adopted from elsewhere.
For EU27 countries, the Community Innovation
Survey provides data on the innovation activities
of firms4,5. It includes information on what inno-
vative firms identified as the major motives for in-
novation. The set of possible motives includes
‘improving energy efficiency’ and ‘reducing envi-
ronmental impact or improved health and safety’.
For 2004-2006,  the most recent period available,
both of these motives were ranked lowest in im-
portance among the set of motives considered6.
Also, when looking at individual EU countries, nei-
ther motive shows up as important7. Furthermore,
the data show no increase over time in the impor-
tance given to energy efficiency; if anything, there
is a decrease8.
Overall, the available statistics do not show an ap-
petite within the business sector for the introduc-
1. Aghion, Hemous and
Veugelers,  No green growth
without innovations,  Bruegel
Policy Brief 11/2009.
2. Identifying the green
component in innovation
statistics turned out to be a
surprisingly difficult exercise,
showing that the importance of
green innovation is not yet
reflected in the standard
statistical framework. A first
priority for an evidence-based
green innovation policy is
therefore to improve green
innovation statistics.
3. The definition of what ‘green’
includes is specific to the
different sources and hence
will be detailed on a source-by-
source basis.
4. The Community Innovation
Survey is a bi-annual Eurostat
survey covering all EU member
states and some associated
countries. The survey assesses
the innovation activities of
firms. To date, there have been
five waves of the CIS survey,
starting in 1992, with the most
recent in 2006.
5. The data used here is only for
the firms that reported
themselves as being
‘innovation active’. Innovation-
active firms are a selected
subset of all firms, typically
biased towards larger firms in
higher-tech industries. In
CIS2004-2006, 38.9 percent of
all sampled firms claimed to be
innovation-active (EU-27; all
sectors). The numbers reported
are therefore likely to be higher
than they would be if the total
population of firms was
considered.
6. Of all innovative firms, only
10 percent identified ‘reduced
energy per unit of output’ as a
highly-important motive for
their innovation activities. 14
percent rated ‘reduced
environmental impact or
improved health and safety’.
The most important motives
were ‘improved quality in goods
and services’ (37.5 percent)
and ‘increased range of goods
and services’ (34 percent).Japan US Germany Korea China France UK Canada
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tion of green innovations. At best, environmental
benefits are a side-effect of companies’ other in-
novation activities. 
2.2 Evidence from green patents
Although not all new green technologies are
patented, information on applications for green
patents can be used to assess the capacity of the
innovation machine to produce new green tech-
nologies. 
The most recent data from the World Intellectual
Property Organisation (WIPO, 2009) shows that
only 2.15 percent of all patent applications under
the Patent Cooperation Treaty are categorised as
‘environmental technologies’ (world average
2002-2006). This is a staggeringly low proportion.
If we look at the countries that are active in
patenting environmental technologies, Japan is
the clearest positive outlier (Figure 1). Not only
does Japan hold 35 percent of all environmental
patents, it is also specialised in environmental
patents. China also specialises in environmental
patents. By ‘specialised’, we mean that the coun-
try has a relative technological advantage (RTA)
greater than 1, where RTA is the share of the coun-
try in world environmental patents relative to the
share of the country in total world patents (see
Figure 1).
The United States, despite its 15-percent share of
world ‘green patents’, is the least specialised in
environmental technologies of the countries
shown in Figure 1. In Europe, Germany is by far the
biggest producer of environmental patents, being
somewhat specialised in environmental technol-
ogy. The UK has a low profile for environmental
technologies9.
OECD patent data permit us to take a closer look
at the trends in the various subfields of environ-
mental technology (Table 1)10. Not only are the
shares of all environmental subfields very low rel-
ative to total patents, but their growth rates are
also not very impressive, being ‘only’ around the
average growth rate of patents.  The exception is
fuel cells, which have grown strongly from a low
base. Nuclear technology has the most limited
growth rate.
Figure 1: Countries’ share of and specialisation in
environmental patents
Source: WIPO 2009, Patent Cooperation Treaty applications
relating to environmental technologies (2001-2005 aver-
age). Note: RTA is share of the country in world environmen-
tal patents relative to the share of the country in total world
patents; RTA > 1 measures specialisation in environmental
patents.
Table 1: Environmental technology patenting
Source: On basis of OECD, Compendium of Patent Statistics,
2008. Note: Renewables: wind (28.8 percent), solar (29.2
percent), geothermal (28 percent), ocean (7.6 percent), bio-
mass (4.8 percent), waste (26.7 percent).
When the share of world environmental patents is
looked at by region, the weak position of the US in
all environmental sub-technologies, compared to
the EU and Japan, again becomes evident (Fig-
ures 2 and 3 on page 4).
7. The positive ‘outliers’ on
energy-efficiency are France
(15 percent), the Netherlands
(13 percent) and Portugal (26
percent). Surprisingly,
Scandinavian countries are at
the bottom end for the energy-
efficiency motive (Finland and
Sweden six percent, Denmark
seven percent).
8. Comparing over time across
different waves of CIS is
notoriously unreliable, as the
survey changed over time.
Nevertheless, Eurostat reports
that the percentage of
innovating firms that quote
effects of innovation on
material and energy efficiency
as highly important increases
from 8.6 percent in 2000 to 9.5
percent in 2004 (EU-27).
Source: Eurostat/Innov
website, main tables.
9. Also, some other countries
are specialised in
environmental technologies
(RTA>1) but are nevertheless
small players (<1 percent
share of environmental
patents), for example Spain RTA
of 1.3; Brazil 1.2; Norway 2.0;
Poland 2.6. India is absent both
in size and specialisation
(RTA=0.7).
10. The OECD uses a more
refined procedure for allocating
patents to environmental
technologies than the
classification used by WIPO.
Share of
technology
2003-05
Av. annual
growth rate
1995-2005
All tech 100% 12.1%
Renewables 0.42% 15.8%
Auto-pollution control 0.85% 12.9%
Fuel cells 0.6% 24.6%
Nuclear 0.45% 5.8%
ICT 36% 15.5%
Nanotech 1.1% 18%
Biotech 5.8% 5.5%0
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Figure 2: % share of world environmental patents
by subfields and by country
Figure 3: Average annual growth rates (%) of
environmental patents 1995-2005
Source: OECD, Compendium of Patent Statistics, 2008.
2.3 Evidence on private green R&D 
Business R&D expenditures on green innovation
would provide a useful measure by which to as-
sess the green innovation machine, but the OECD
dataset on private R&D expenditures does not re-
port by technology11, but rather by economic sec-
tor in which firms investing in R&D are active. 
2.4Evidence for green innovation in the
electricity generation and distribution sector
Electricity generation and distribution (EGD)12 is
responsible for a large share of greenhouse-gas
emissions. In this section we look more closely at
R&D and innovation by firms in this sector13. 
The EGD sector is remarkably inactive in R&D. It
represents less than one percent of total world
R&D expenditures by the business sector. Even
more alarmingly, rather than increasing, the sec-
tor’s low R&D activities have decreased over
time14. Data from the OECD Analytical Business
Enterprise Research and Development Database
(ANBERD, 2007) show that the EGD sector’s share
in world business R&D went from 0.9 percent in
the period 1990-95 to 0.5 percent in the period
2000-04. By comparison, in the EU in 2004, the
EGD sector accounted for 2.2 percent of value
added.
When looking at EGD R&D in different regions, the
US emerges as a minor player, while Japan and the
EU on aggregate are relatively strong. Within the
EU, France is the positive outlier, both in terms of
size and specialisation; the UK is second in size,
but its position has declined over time. Spain is a
relatively big spender on EGD R&D (Table 2).
Table 2: EGD R&D expenditures, selected coun-
tries and regions
Source: OECD, ANBERD (2007). Note: The Spanish increase
reverses the downward trend seen from 1995-2000; the
Swedish trend was downwards between 1992-2001.
11. The latest JRC-IPTS
Scoreboard on the largest R&D
spenders
(http://iri.jrc.ec.europa.eu/rese
arch/scoreboard_2009.htm)
shows that, in 2008, among
the EU’s thousand largest R&D
spenders, there are six
companies from the alternative
energy sector. Together they
represent €324 million in R&D
expenditures, or 0.25 percent
of total R&D spending by the
1000 largest EU R&D spenders.
The largest company is Vestas
Wind from Denmark with an
R&D budget of €223 million; all
others are smaller German
companies.  The non-EU largest
R&D spending scoreboard
includes no alternative energy
category. 
12. This includes all types,
including nuclear. 
13. A caveat: not all R&D and
innovation activities by firms
in this sector are necessarily
related to climate change.
14. While the average annual
growth rate of total business
enterprises increased by 3.5
percent in the period 2000-04,
the average annual growth rate
of the EGD sector was -3.5
percent (Source: OECD, ANBERD
(2007).
15. While the OECD uses
questionnaire information from
an inventory of all R&D-active
firms, the IPTS-R&D Scoreboard
data uses company account
information from the 1000
largest EU and non-EU R&D
spenders.
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The European Commission’s R&D scoreboard (Eu-
ropean Commission, IPTS, 2009) provides more
recent information on R&D spending by large com-
panies15. The latest data (2009) confirm the weak
R&D picture for the EGD sector. For the EU, there
are 15 EGD companies among the top thousand
EU R&D spenders. These companies have an av-
erage R&D-to-sales ratio of only 1.3 percent in
2008. Of these 15 companies, only two – Areva
and EdF, both French – are among the EU’s top 100
R&D spenders. In the non-EU scoreboard of the top
thousand R&D spenders, there are 11 EGD com-
panies (of which none are from the US) with an
average R&D-to-sales ratio of 0.8 percent in 2008,
compared to a 3.7 percent average in the non-EU
scoreboard. These figures show the low innovation
activity of EGD companies generally, with low
R&D-to-sales ratios compared to other sectors.
The low rate of R&D spending in the EGD sector im-
plies that this pivotal sector will not be active in
generating its own innovations to reduce emis-
sions of greenhouse gases. Furthermore, marginal
R&D activity in this sector hampers the effective
adoption of innovations developed elsewhere. The
innovation data for this sector show that in most
EU countries, EGD firms are less active than firms
from other sectors in implementing new innova-
tions (CIS, 2004-2006). Furthermore, ‘green’ mo-
tivations for R&D seem to be given a low priority
by the EGD sector, as is the case for other sec-
tors16.  While other sectors typically quote high in-
novation costs and access to finance as the main
barriers to innovation, in the EGD sector the factor
that is rated by most non-innovative companies
as hampering them is that there is no demand for
innovative products17.
Even allowing for poor data availability, the empir-
ical picture seems consistent: innovation and R&D
activities in the EGD sector are low and are not in-
creasing; on the contrary, they are often in decline.
3 EXPLAINING THE FAILING PRIVATE GREEN
INNOVATION MACHINE
The picture of the private green innovation ma-
chine presented in section 2 is not an attractive
one either for the generation of green technolo-
gies, or for the adoption and diffusion of green
technologies. There are several possible reasons
why private green innovation activities are not
progressing as they could and should. 
• The greatest benefits from green technologies
are public rather than private (a reduction of
the environmental externality). As a conse-
quence, the private willingness to pay for green
innovation will be low unless there is a clear
and appropriate price put on the externality. 
• A classic reason for a lack of innovation is the
appropriation problem. Firms will be reluctant
to innovate when they cannot fully appropriate
the returns from their innovations. This argu-
ment may hold particularly for green innova-
tions as they are typically complex,
cumulative-process innovations, where classic
patent protection may need to be comple-
mented with other appropriation mechanisms
if it is to be effective.
• Another classical barrier to innovation is access
to finance. Financial constraints will be even
more limiting for green innovations, especially
the more breakthrough type of green innova-
tion, because such innovations carry a high
technical risk/uncertainty. But also important
for green innovation are the higher commercial
risks arising from uncertain market conditions.
The combination of technological and market
uncertainties will be particularly important for
early-stage green technologies. As these are
often introduced by small-scale, radical inno-
vators lacking collateral and reputation, such
young, radical green innovators may be partic-
ularly held back by financial constraints.
• For green technologies that have passed the
prototype stage, there are still significant learn-
ing effects during the initial stage of marketing.
Customers may want to wait to adopt the new
technologies until they are at a later stage,
when their costs are lower. In the absence of
early lead-users, learning effects cannot mate-
rialise, preventing these technologies from
16. The Netherlands has the
highest score for the
innovativeness of its EGD
sector, with 63 percent of firms
classed as innovation-active.
Italy and the UK are at the
bottom with 30 percent. Only
for a few countries do we have
information on the motives for
innovation in the EGD sector. In
line with the results for other
sectors, ‘environmental, health
& safety’ and ‘energy reduction’
are of little importance.
17. For instance, in Spain,  half
of non-innovative EGD firms
report ‘no demand for
innovation’ as a limiting factor,
compared to 32 percent for all
sectors and compared to 12
percent who say innovation
costs are too high.COLD START FOR THE GREEN INNOVATION MACHINE Aghion, Veugelers and Serre
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reaching their most cost-efficient configura-
tions. 
• Once on the market, new green technologies
face competition from existing dirtier tech-
nologies, which enjoy an initial installed-base
advantage. As discussed in more detail in the
accompanying policy brief (Aghion et al,
2009), taking into account that R&D resources
will be directed towards the most profitable
ends, the innovation machine if left on its own
will favour continued work on dirty technolo-
gies, impeding the roll-out of clean technolo-
gies (Acemoglu et al, 2009).
In addition, incentives for innovation in the EGD
sector are particularly lacking, due to:
• Regulation, which induces risk aversion, re-
ducing the incentives to invest;
• Low levels of competition in the sector nation-
ally, and fragmentation internationally;
• Difficult access to the electricity supply grid for
new technologies such as wind or solar power; 
• Technological issues still to be resolved, such
as energy storage (batteries).
4 SOME EVIDENCE ON CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY
INTERVENTION
As the private green innovation machine, when
left on its own, cannot be expected to rise to the
climate-change challenge, government interven-
tion is needed. In an accompanying Bruegel pol-
icy brief (Aghion et al, 2009), we draw on the
insights provided by an economic model of di-
rected technological change for the environment
(Acemoglu et al, 2009), to set out the optimal pol-
icy intervention that is needed to turn on the
private green innovation machine. Addressing en-
vironmental and knowledge externalities will re-
quire an early and sizeable combination of carbon
pricing and R&D subsidies. In this section, we look
at the empirical evidence on how these two piv-
otal policy instruments have been implemented
so far: establishing a price for carbon (section
4.1), and public spending on green R&D invest-
ments (section 4.2).
4.1Carbon pricing: carbon taxes and cap-and-
trade 
A price for carbon that is sufficiently high and pre-
dictable over the longer term would be an incen-
tive for R&D investments leading to the creation
of new green technologies, as well as for the adop-
tion by the market of emissions-reducing invest-
ments. These benefits would be most clearly
obtained through a carbon tax. 
Environmental taxes averaged in the EU27 6.4
percent of total tax revenues in 2006. This is a
very low number, which is even slightly decreas-
ing over time. Denmark is the country with the
highest share of 12 percent (Environment Policy
Review, 2008). When focusing on energy taxes
only, a similar downward trend over time can be
observed (Figure 4). More recently, new carbon
taxes have been introduced or are planned. France
is the notable example, having said it will introduce
by 2010 a €17 levy per tonne of carbon dioxide,
with a non-specified regular increase.
Figure 4: Implicit tax rate on energy (EU27)
Source: Eurostat (2009).
The low level and the short-term nature of EU car-
bon taxes translates into low incentives for green
innovations. There is also a high dispersion of car-
bon taxes across EU countries. This fragmented
picture undermines the effectiveness of carbon
taxes in leveraging innovation, whatever the level
of the tax. Although the fragmentation has reduced
somewhat over time, there is nevertheless sub-
stantial variance in implicit tax rates on energy18.
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Denmark and the UK have the EU’s highest rates,
while Romania and Latvia the lowest rates (Fig-
ure 5).
Figure 5: EU states, implicit tax rate on energy
Source: Eurostat (2009).
Cap-and-trade systems also generate a carbon
price, but because a great deal of information and
expertise is needed to get the emissions-capping
and allowance-allocation processes right, there is
more room for error and exposure to political pres-
sure, compared to carbon tax schemes. The Euro-
pean Union’s Emissions Trading System (or EU
ETS) opened in 2005 and can still be considered
to be in a learning phase. Carbon-price volatility
has proved to be an issue for the ETS  in its early
years. 
The EU carbon price reached its highest level of
€32.90 in April 2006, but stood at around €13.70
in mid-November 2009. The drop in the price in
early 2007 (the spot price reached almost zero in
April 2007) marked the end of the first phase of
the EU ETS. This was due to the absence of bank-
ability between the first and second ETS phases
(2005-07 and 2008-12), as first-phase al-
lowances could not be used for later phases19.     
Reforms have been introduced to make the ETS
more predictable after 2013 (for example through
a more centralised allocation of allowances), but
factors such as the uncertainty about the alloca-
tion of emissions allowances for free for some
sectors could continue to disrupt the carbon price.
Overall, the evidence on carbon pricing is consis-
tent with the inadequate performance of the
private green innovation machine. Current carbon-
tax levels and cap-and-trade systems are not gen-
erating a sufficiently high carbon price to induce
green innovation. Furthermore, the carbon price
has not been stable, which is a disincentive for
green innovation.   
Figure 6: Carbon price, Dec 09 futures contract
Source: ECX historical contracts data (daily futures, futures
and options).
4.2 EVIDENCE ON PUBLIC GREEN R&D
Alongside carbon prices, green R&D subsidies are
a complementary policy instrument. Subsidies are
particularly important in the early phases of de-
velopment of new green technologies, for ad-
dressing the installed-base disadvantage of new
technologies and the financing barriers faced by
new innovators. 
In this section, we look at the most recent evi-
dence on the size of public green R&D expendi-
tures, in the form either of financing of R&D by
public-sector research organisations, or of subsi-
dies to private sector R&D 20.
Public R&D spending for the ‘control and care of
the environment’ category is almost negligible as
a share of total public R&D spending. Furthermore
there is little indication in the data that this share
is increasing, at least for the period up to 2005.
Compared to the US and Japan, the EU27 as an ag-
gregate performs relatively well. But this European
Union aggregate hides a lack of coordination by
EU countries of these outlays, making them less
effective compared to US or Japanese public
spending.
18. Calculating the standard
deviation over 3 years across
all EU 27 countries (+Norway),
it evolves from 10 in 1996-
1998 to 6 in the last period
available (2005-2007).
Source:  Own calculations on
the basis of Eurostat.
19. See also Tirole, 2009.
20. Unfortunately, there is little
data available on public
spending that is comparable
across countries. As a source
for R&D subsidies, we use the
GBAORD Government Budget
Appropriations or Outlays on
R&D data (Eurostat). Although
the data has serious limitations
and was only reported after a
large time lag, it is available for
a wide set of (OECD) countries.
GBAORD is split according to
‘socio-economic objectives’
(NABS classification).  These
include the two groups we are
interested in: NABS03: control
and care of the environment,
and NABS05: production,
distribution and rational
utilisation of energy.
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pattern to ‘environment’. Again, the US is doing
badly both in levels of public spending and in
growth rates (at least up to 2005). The EU spends
moderately with little growth. Japan is a strong
public spender on energy, though its spending is
declining. This correlates with the relative strength
of Japan in energy technologies, as illustrated by
the patent applications data.
Figure 8: Public R&D expenditure on ‘production,
distribution and rational utilisation of energy’
Source: Own calculations on basis of Eurostat, Statistics in
Focus, 292008. ‘Production, distribution and rational utiliti-
sation of energy’ corresponds to NABS05 in the GBAORD clas-
sification. EU-27 is a Eurostat estimate; EU average annual
growth rate is for EU15; US values are provisional; total
GBAORD excludes General University Funds;  Japanese values
are provisional.
Within the EU, France and Germany are the most
important public funders of energy R&D, but with
little or negative growth rates.  The UK again lags
behind. Spain is expanding its public R&D budgets
for energy, correlating with a higher level of inno-
vative behaviour in its electricity sector (cf supra).  
More recently (2007), US federal government
spending on basic research dedicated to energy
represented 0.1 percent of total research spend-
ing, with 0.5 percent for natural resources and en-
vironment. These are even lower proportions than
in 2005. However, there is an indication that the
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Figure 7: Public R&D expenditure on ‘control and
care of the environment’
Source:  Own calculations on basis of Eurostat, Statistics in
Focus, 29-2008. Note: ‘Control and care of the environment’
corresponds to NABS03 in the GBAORD classification. EU-27
is a Eurostat estimate; EU average annual growth rate is for
EU15. US values are provisional; total GBAORD excludes Gen-
eral University Funds; Japanese values are provisional.
Table 3: Public R&D expenditures for ‘control and
care of the environment’ (GBAORD- NABS03 data)
Source: Own calculations on basis of Eurostat, Statistics in
Focus, 292008. To compare, average annual growth rate of
total GBAORD for EU15= 4.2 percent, US: +3.2 percent, Japan:
-5.0 percent.
Among EU countries, France and Germany are the
major green public spenders, while the UK scores
low and in fact saw a declining spend during the
period under consideration (2000-05).
Public R&D spending on ‘production, distribution
and rational utilisation of energy’ shows a similar
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Germany 585 3.1% 1.8%
France 431 2.7% 12.7%
UK 233 1.8% -1.4%
Italy 259 2.7% 8.6%
Spain 229 3.0% 8.6%
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downward trend may have started to reverse in
2008, with the $1.5 billion for the US Climate
Change Science Program and Hydrogen Fuel Ini-
tiative.
Table 4: Public R&D expenditures for ‘production,
distribution and rational utilisation of energy’
(GBAORD- NABS05 data)
Source: Own calculations on basis of Eurostat, Statistics in
Focus, 292008. 
At the EU level, research funding through the EU’s
Seventh Framework Programme (FP7)21, which
covers the period 2007-2013, has increased sub-
stantially to €50 billion for the five-year window
(the global budget for FP6 was €18 billion). Of the
FP7 budget, €2.35 billion is dedicated to energy
research, €1.89 billion to environment (including
climate change), and €2.7 billion for Euratom.
While these numbers represent a serious increase
over past budgets, in relative terms the share of
energy and environment has decreased over suc-
cessive FPs, as Figure 9 shows. The first FP was
heavily concentrated on energy (in the context of
the oil crisis), but the focus gradually shifted to
ICT and broader applications in support of indus-
trial competitiveness.
The recently adopted European Economic Recov-
ery Package (May 2009) includes a substantial
budget for carbon capture and storage and for off-
shore wind power projects, as well as for some of
the cross-border infrastructure connections that
will increase the efficiency of the electricity grid22.
Beyond FP funding, the technological approach to
climate change is developed through the European
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Germany 482 2.8% -2.5%
France 718 4.5% 1.5%
UK 52 0.4% 0.8%
Italy 383 4.0% 4.7%
Spain 168 2.2% 7.7%
Sweden 59 2.3% -11.2%
Technologies Action Plan (ETAP). The European
Commission adopted this in 2004, with the inten-
tion of overcoming the barriers hindering the de-
velopment of environmental technologies.  This
includes action on emissions standards for new
passenger cars and on fuel quality. Several en-
ergy-efficiency standards have recently been
adopted or were already in place.  In terms of pub-
lic funds, no clear EU budget is associated with
ETAP, as it aims to leverage other public and
private funding. ETAP attempts to mobilise green
versions of existing EU instruments such as JTI
(Joint Technology Initiative), ETP (European Tech-
nology Platforms), LMI (Lead Market Initiative)
and the CIP (Community Innovation Programme).
ETAP also supports environmental technology ac-
tion in developing countries.
Figure 9: EC-FP funding by technological area, a
comparison across FPs
Source: EC, DG-RTD
5 VENTURE CAPITAL FINANCING OF GREEN
INNOVATION
The evidence presented so far is not favourable for
the green innovation machine. The low level of
private green innovation activities correlate with
the low level of public green intervention, in terms
of both carbon pricing and public green R&D ex-
penditure. However, as most of the regular data on
innovation (R&D expenditures, patents and inno-
vations) is only reported with a time-lag, they may
fail to pick up the very recent trends, which could
be more positive for green innovation, particularly
because a more favourable climate for public in-
21. The Framework
Programmes (FP) represent
the EU budget commitment to
research. They are multi-annual
programmes, with the latest
(FP7) running from 2007-
2013.
22. The total amount of the
package is €5 billion. €3.98
billion is allocated to energy
infrastructure projects to
strengthen the EU’s energy
security. Within the energy
funding, big energy utilities get
€1 billion for carbon capture
and storage and €565 million
for offshore wind farms. See
http://www.euractiv.com/en/en
ergy/parliament-approves-4-
energy-projects/
article-182096.
FP1 FP2 FP3 FP4 FP5 FP6 FP7
Life sciences
ICT
Industrial and materials tech.
Transport
Socio-economic
Security and space
Energy
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tervention seems to be developing. 
Venture capital financing gives a more recent
overview of green innovation trends. Data from
Dow Jones VentureSource shows the increasing
interest from venture capitalists in the ‘cleantech’
category, which includes not only renewable en-
ergies but anything associated with alternative
energy. As Figure 10 shows, this interest has
taken off since 2007. Although both the US and EU
saw a similar increase in the number of cleantech
deals, the US outperformed the EU in terms of the
amounts raised.
Figure 10: Euro raised in Europe and the US by ven-
ture-backed cleantech companies, annual data
Figure 11: Growth rates of amounts raised by ven-
ture-backed companies by sector
Source: Dow Jones VentureSource.
In terms of growth rates, venture capital invest-
ment in cleantech outperforms any other venture
capital sector. In 2008 especially, when other sec-
tors have seen declining rates of investment, re-
newable energy continued its growth (Figure 11).
Interestingly, the dip in the renewable energy
growth rate seen in 2007 (Figure 11) corresponds
to a drop in EU ETS carbon prices from mid-2006,
illustrating the sensitivity of the green innovation
machine to too-low carbon prices.
Despite increasing venture capital volumes, clean-
tech only accounts for seven percent of all equity
investment into European venture capital backed
companies in 2009 (second quarter). Neverthe-
less, momentum seems to have been created. De-
loitte in their 2009 Global Trends in Venture
Capital23 report note that, despite the economic
and financial crisis, 63 percent of surveyed ven-
ture capitalists anticipate an increase in their
cleantech investments. This was the highest score
among all sectors considered (Figure 12). This in-
crease is particularly high in the Asia-Pacific re-
gion and for continental Europe, but less so in the
US and the UK. The report attributes this increas-
ing interest to an anticipated increase in govern-
ment support for cleantech, both through public
(co-) financing and provision of incentives for the
private sector. 
Figure 12: Anticipated level of investment change
in selected sectors over the next three years
Source: Deloitte, 2009.
23. The survey was conducted
in cooperation with venture
capital associations globally
(eg EVCA, NCVA).  There were
725 responses from general
partners of venture capital
firms from the Americas, Asia
Pacific (AP), Europe and Israel.
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6 CONCLUSIONS
In view of the real and sizeable climate change
challenge, we need a green innovation machine
operating at full speed. The private green innova-
tion machine, left on its own, is not up to the chal-
lenge. It needs government support. As detailed in
Aghion et al (2009), a suitable policy to turn on
the private green innovation machine should com-
bine consistent carbon pricing with initial sub-
stantial research subsidies.
Overall, the admittedly not very up-to-date data on
public green R&D spending shows that public
budgets for environment and energy R&D are very
low. Only very recently can some more promising
signs of increased public R&D budgets be ob-
served. More importantly, recent and current low
budgets come on top of the lack of a clear long-
term consistent global carbon price. Government
policy remains far from where it needs to be if the
green innovation machine is to be turned on and
start running efficiently. 
Although past evidence on private green R&D and
innovation shows low levels of activity and little
dynamism, momentum seems to be building. Ob-
servations of the venture capital market provide
the clearest support for this assertion. But as ven-
ture capital optimism seems to be based on an an-
ticipation of government support for cleantech,
the question is if we are seeing the seeds of a pro-
lific public-private partnership or the beginnings
of a bubble – a green tech bubble – which may
burst when expectations are not met.
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